A directory traversal attack aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the intended folder. By manipulating files with "dot-dot-slash (../)" sequences and its variations, or by using absolute file paths, it may be possible to access arbitrary files and directories stored on the filesystem; including application source code, configuration, and other critical system files.
In this lesson, you will learn how directory traversal works and how to mitigate it in your application. You will first use a directory traversal attack to hack a vulnerable web server. We will then explain directory traversal by showing you the backend code of that vulnerable server. Finally, we will teach you how to prevent directory traversal from affecting your code.
Ready to learn? Buckle your seat belts, put on your hacker's hat, and let's get started!
Essentially, the attack is accomplished by adding characters such as ../
into a URL that serves content from a directory structure. The content is usually served from a base directory, such as /public
. An attacker can supply filenames that contain ../
or a URL encoded equivalent %2e%2e%2f
. These URLs allow the attacker to break out of the base directory and view files stored in other folders on the filesystem.
To illustrate this, let's jump into the code. Below you will find the a function, which constructs a filesystem path from the URL. All files and directories returned by the function are served statically by the web server.
The most robust way to prevent directory traversal attacks is to avoid relying on user-supplied input when dealing with the filesystem APIs. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done and might require rewriting a considerable chunk of your application.
A more realistic mitigation mechanism is to prevent the user-supplied directory from being higher up on the filesystem than the directory used to serve static content.
For example, if an application serves files from /wwwroot/public/
, any canonical representation of the user requested path must start with /wwwroot/public/
. Otherwise, the request could break out of the target directory.
The code example below shows how to normalize the user-supplied path and check whether it starts in the expected directory. To achieve this in JavaScript, use path.normalize or similar.
The path normalization will deal with malicious inputs such as https://todoapp.startup.io/public/../
. However, we can still trick it by encoding the .
character as %2e
. To be fully protected, you need to sanitize your user-supplied data and get rid of unexpected inputs, for instance:
If the above measures are impractical, consider disallowing dangerous characters explicitly. For example, the below code removes the URL-encoded characters from the user-supplied input.
Correct sanitization of user input is hard work and requires constant verification against newly discovered ways to bypass known protection methods. In almost all cases, it is a better choice to use a well-maintained open-source library.
For instance, to serve static files in JavaScript, consider using st. Another option is to build your application with web frameworks, such as express, which have built-in support for serving static content.
To decide which libraries to trust, use Snyk Advisor! Snyk Advisor provides information on a given package's popularity, community support, and security. Also, check your open source libraries with vulnerability scanners such as Snyk, which will notify you about all new vulnerabilities discovered in any libraries you are using, and will help you mitigate them easily.
To recap, to mitigate directory traversal in your codebase, avoid calling filesystem APIs with user-supplied data as input. If that is not practical, validate that the user-supplied path is a child of the directory which the application serves from. Remember to sanitize the input to prevent malicious payloads from tricking you through techniques such as URL encoding. Finally, instead of writing all the logic yourself, consider using popular open-source libraries which handle things for you.
st is a popular JavaScript library used for serving static files. In its early version, it was vulnerable to directory traversal, which actually posed a serious security threat for the entire NPM ecosystem.
The diff below is from the commit, which added the sanitization to catch directory traversal attempts with URL encoding.
Take the code tour to understand the fix.
To learn more about directory traversal, check out some other great content produced by Snyk:
If you want to discover more about the vulnerability present in st, watch our YouTube video and read our blog post.
Read our white paper on Zip Slip, a directory traversal vulnerability that results in remote code execution.
If the white paper got you worried, learn how to mitigate Zip Slip in your code-base with our cheat sheet.